

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 007375

61

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DRAFTED BY ARA/CAR:DCNORTON:BK

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GY, AO

SUBJECT: ANGOLA - MULCAHY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH GUYANESE
AMBASSADOR MANN

1. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MULCAHY (AF) HELD LONG
AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH GUYANESE AMBASSADOR MANN ON
JAN 9 THAT COVERED CURRENT U.S. POLICY ON ANGOLA, THE
PROBABLE OUTCOME OF THE OAU SUMMIT MEETING, AND THE
LIKELY POSITION THAT THE U.S. WILL TAKE IN SUPPORTING
THE CONSENSUS THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM THIS MEETING.

2. MULCAHY STRESSED THAT OUR POLICY, AS INDICATED IN
THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT LETTERS TO A NUMBER OF AFRICAN
LEADERS WAS THAT THERE BE AN EARLY END TO THE ANGOLAN
CONFLICT, THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES BE WITHDRAWN, INCLUDING
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES, AND THAT THERE BE SOME FORMULA
FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS FACTIONS.
MULCAHY EMPHASIZED THAT OUR INTERESTS IN ANGOLA WERE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 007375

MINIMAL AND THAT OUR CONCERN ABOUT ANGOLA STEMS SOLELY

FROM THE SOVIETS' MASSIVE SUPPORT TO THE MPLA. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN ISSUE CAN BE DETERMINED BY THE AFRICANS THEMSELVES, AND OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO SUPPORTING THE OAU'S MEDIATION EFFORTS. HE CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD PROVIDED MODEST MATERIEL ASSISTANCE, NOT TRAINING, TO ROBERTO AND SIVIMBI IN THE PAST, WITH THE LEVEL OF OUR ASSISTANCE HAVING BEEN INCREASED LAST SUMMER TO MEET THE SOVIET CHALLENGE. STILL, OUR TOTAL SUPPORT HAS FALLEN FAR SHORT OF THE SOVIET EFFORT.

3. MULCAHY SAID THAT TWO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CAUSED US TO BE MORE OPTIMISTIC. THE FIRST WAS THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL CALLING FOR AN END TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION, AND THE SECOND WAS THE TRIPARTITE MEETING IN DAR-ES-SALAAM AMONG NYERERE, KAUNDA, AND MACHEL. DESPITE THEIR DIFFERENCES, THE THREE AFRICAN LEADERS HAD AGREED THAT AN AFRICAN SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE--THAT THE FOREIGN INTERVENTIONISTS SHOULD BE EXPELLED AND THAT A PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY SHOULD EMERGE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO MANN'S QUERY AS TO THE PROBABLE OUTCOME OF THE OAU MEETING, MULCAHY WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT THE OAU WAS LIKELY TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON RESOLUTIONS (1) CONDEMNING THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION, AND (2) ALL OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, AS WELL AS ISSUE AN APPEAL FOR ALL ANGOLANS TO REACH A CEASE-FIRE. MULCAHY, HOWEVER, CONCEDED THAT REACHING CONSENSUS ON AN OAU MECHANISM TO FACILITATE TALKS MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT TO ATTAIN, AND HE DID NOT SHARE MANN'S CONFIDENCE THAT THE OAU WOULD RECOGNIZE THE MPLA AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. IF THE OAU RECOGNIZES ONLY THE MPLA, IT WOULD BE GRANTING LEGITIMACY TO A MINORITY GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING ONE-QUARTER OF THE POPULATION AND LAND AREA. SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO BRINGING A QUICK END TO THIS CIVIL WAR.

5. MANN ASKED WHAT POSITION THE U.S. WOULD TAKE IF THE OAU CONDEMNS SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION AND VOTED TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 007375

RECOGNIZE THE MPLA. MULCAHY AFFIRMED THAT WE SUPPORTED THE OAU'S EFFORTS AND THAT WE WOULD NOT DEFY THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS. HE REPORTED THAT WE WERE EMBARRASSED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION AND HAD KNOWN ABOUT IT ONLY AFTER THE FACT. THUS, WE WOULD ENDORSE AN OAU RESOLUTION CONDEMNING SOUTH AFRICA. AS FOR FOLLOWING AN OAU LEAD IN RECOGNIZING THE MPLA, MULCAHY STATED THAT OUR PRACTICE IN AFRICA WAS NOT TO

TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON RECOGNIZING A NEW GOVERNMENT BUT TO DELAY EXTENDING RECOGNITION UNTIL A GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED AND RECOGNIZED BY A MAJORITY OF GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE REGION. IF THE MPLA EMERGES AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA, THEN THE USG CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXTEND RECOGNITION WITHIN DUE COURSE. MULCAHY SAID WE HAVE NOTHING AGAINST THE MPLA EXCEPT THE SOVIET INTERVENTION ON ITS SIDE. OUR PREFERENCES, THOUGH, ARE FOR A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, EMBRACING THE THREE FACTIONS. HOWEVER, WE OPPOSE THE BLATANT EFFORTS OF THE MPLA, WITH SOVIET/CUBAN ASSISTANCE, TO SEIZE CONTROL. REGARDLESS OF WHAT GOVERNMENT EMERGES, WE HAVE AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THE AMBASSADOR FOUND THIS TO BE AN ENCOURAGING ATTITUDE.

6. MANN SAID THAT, AS A NON-AFRICAN COUNTRY, GUYANA WOULD NORMALLY FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE AFRICAN STATES. HOWEVER, THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT IN GUYANA'S AFRICAN POLICY IS TO OPPOSE APARTHEID, AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE GOG OPPOSES ANYONE SUPPORTING SOUTH AFRICA. FOR THIS REASON, THE GOG HAS MADE NO SECRET OF ITS MORAL SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA AND OPPOSITION TO FNLA/UNITA FOR SEEKING SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE. FOR PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM TO SIDE WITH ANY OTHER FACTION THAN THE MPLA WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNTENABLE. MANN CLAIMED THAT GUYANA'S SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA HAS, THUS FAR, BEEN LIMITED TO PROVIDING MORAL SUPPORT AND NOT TO ASSISTING THEM THROUGH ANY FORM OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. HE STATED THAT THE GOG WOULD BE LESS THAN SATISFIED IF ANY COALITION GOVERNMENT INCLUDED ROBERTO AND SIVIMBI. MULCAHY REMINDED MANN THAT THE MPLA, UNITA, AND FNLA HAD ORIGINALLY ATTEMPTED TO FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 007375

PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE, BUT THE MPLA, WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE, HAD EXPELLED THE OTHER TWO GROUPS LAST SUMMER. ANYTHING LESS THAN A COALITION GOVERNMENT EMBRACING THE THREE PRINCIPAL FACTIONS WOULD NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM AND WOULD LEAD ONLY TO A PROLONGATION OF THE CONFLICT.

7. MANN THEN ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE U.S.S.R./CUBAN INTEREST IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT. MULCAHY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WAS TO ASSIST THE MPLA IN GAINING THE UPPER HAND PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE IN THE HOPE THAT THE THEN PRO-SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN PORTUGAL WOULD LOOK TO THEM TO FORM THE POST-INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT. EVENTS IN PORTUGAL CHANGED, AND THE PORTUGUESE DEPARTED BY TURNING POWER OVER TO THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE WITHOUT FAVORING ANY GROUPS.

8. MULCAHY SAID THAT GUYANA SHOULD NOT LOOSE SIGHT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CUBAN/SOVIET INVASION, FOR IT DEMONSTRATES THAT SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE USG IS ABLE TO MOUNT AN ARMED INVASION SOME 8,000 MILES FROM ITS OWN TERRITORY. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD NOT CONTRACTED FOR UNDER THE TERMS OF DETENTE, AND IF WE HAD NOT RESPONDED, OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES MIGHT FALSELY CONCLUDE THAT WE WERE AFRAID OR INDIFFERENT.

HE ASKED MANN IF HE WAS AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF THE CUBAN INVASION AND WAS GUYANA PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION. MANN REPLIED THAT DESCRIBING THE CUBAN ACTION AS AN ARMED INVASION WAS A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION. HE CONTENDED THAT THE U.S. HAD NO INFORMATION TO PROVE ITS CONTENTIONS THAT THE CUBANS HAD USED GUYANESE AIRFIELD FACILITIES TO REFUEL FLIGHTS TO ANGOLA. HE REPEATED THAT CUBA HAD NEVER ASKED FOR THE GOG'S PERMISSION TO SUPPORT ITS AIRLIFT AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS THUS FAR NOT EXCEEDED GIVING ITS MORAL SUPPORT TO THE MPLA.

9. MANN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FIRST SECRETARY HALDER AND HIS CONFIDENTIAL SECRETARY WHO TOOK LENGTHY NOTES OF THIS MEETING. WE HOPE THAT MANN WILL ACCURATELY REPORT THESE DISCUSSIONS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO FOREIGN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 007375

MINISTER WILLS. KISSINGER

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